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ballot during the presidential primary election of 2008. We find that voters who 
had knowledge of the elite endorsement differed little from those who did not. We 
show, however, that Schwarzenegger’s endorsement was conditionally related 
to support for the measures, depending on whether or not voters approved of 
Schwarzenegger’s job performance as governor, with voters who approved of 
Schwarzenegger’s job performance being more likely to vote in favor of the meas-
ures compared with voters who disapproved of his job performance. Our results 
confirm that it is not just the knowledge of a cue that matters, but also the voter’s 
assessment of the endorser that influences the cue’s effectiveness.
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1  Introduction
In presidential and congressional elections, there are strong theoretical argu-
ments and empirical studies that suggest voters routinely use cues and heuristics 
as information shortcuts to help them make decisions that are consistent with 
their preferences. For direct democracy, however, assuming that voters use cues 
to make decisions on initiatives and referendums is troublesome: elite endorse-
ments do not appear on the ballot next to initiatives and referendums in the way 
that party labels are often included next to the names of political candidates.
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There is limited empirical support suggesting that endorsements help voters 
make decisions on ballot measures. On one hand, scholars have shown that 
voters can use elite endorsements to approximate a fully informed vote. On the 
other, new research questions the assumption that voters’ use of elite endorse-
ments is commonplace. If widespread usage of elite endorsements is essential 
for voters to make reasoned choices on initiatives and referendums – which is the 
implicit assumption of much of the scholarship on voters in direct democracy –  
we need to understand when and how often voters use cues when making deci-
sions in direct democracy.
We provide new evidence to assess how often and to what extent voters 
use elite endorsements to make decisions on ballot measures. Using an elec-
tion survey from California’s presidential primary in February 2008, we evaluate 
the effectiveness of then-Governor Schwarzenegger’s endorsement of four veto 
(also called “popular”) referendums on the ballot. Our results suggest that voters 
who were aware of the cue used the endorsement conditionally. That is, voters used 
the cue to guide their decisions based on whether they approved or disapproved 
of Governor Schwarzenegger’s performance in office. In particular, voters who had 
a positive view of the governor and knew his endorsement were more likely to 
support the referendums; the opposite was true for voters who disapproved of his 
job performance and knew his endorsement. Our results add to the literature on 
elite endorsements, showing that governors can be persuasive cue-givers.
2  Background
The earliest research on voting behavior and opinion formation paints an unflat-
tering picture of the American voter (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964). 
Such findings question the ability of the average voter to make reasoned demo-
cratic decisions, a fear that additional research has supported by highlighting the 
limited nature of political knowledge among the electorate (for a summary, see 
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).
As Lupia (2006) argues, however, academic elitism has clouded our think-
ing about what we should expect voters to know about politics. Political facts, 
while they can help voters make more informed and perhaps better decisions 
(e.g., Bartels 1996), may not be critical for democratic decision-making. Voters 
require “operative knowledge” that is relevant to the decision at hand (e.g., 
Lupia 2006; Johnson 2009). Indeed, Downs (1957) argues that – as long as 
political parties offer a relatively stable set of policy positions in their platforms 
– ideology and party labels can act as cheap and easy information shortcuts. 
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Other research confirms that voters can rely on knowledgeable and trustwor-
thy sources of information as a substitute for extensive knowledge to make an 
informed decision (e.g., Lupia 1994; Popkin 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; 
Druckman 2001; Druckman et al. 2009, 2010).
Lupia’s (1994) seminal article sets the baseline for scholarly understanding of 
how voters use information shortcuts in direct democracy. Surveying voters about 
five initiatives in California’s 1988 general election, Lupia shows that individu-
als who were aware of key elite endorsements made decisions that were similar 
to voters who had extensive “encyclopedic” knowledge of the measures. Based 
on Lupia’s empirical evidence, the conventional wisdom in political science has 
become that voters routinely use information shortcuts to make political deci-
sions (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004).
Assuming that voters often use cues to make decisions in all types of elec-
tions is problematic. Indeed, voters use party labels extensively in national can-
didate elections, where voters select candidates that represent their own partisan 
attachment more than 90% of the time. Moreover, party labels are extraordinarily 
accessible cues for voters to use as they are on the ballot itself. By contrast, cues 
are not available on the ballot for initiatives and referendums. Yet, both Lupia 
(1994) and Karp (1998) show that elite endorsements do help guide voter behav-
ior on ballot measures. Recent empirical enquiries (Burnett et al. 2010; Burnett 
and Parry 2012), however, suggest voters’ use of cues in direct democracy is not 
universal. In Burnett et al. (2010), they find that, after controlling for policy pref-
erence, voters who knew a cue did not vote differently than uninformed voters. 
In Burnett and Parry’s (2012) experiments involving Arkansas residents, they 
show that a gubernatorial endorsement had only a modest – and sometimes 
nonexistent – effect on support for ballot measures.
In other words, the limited research on voter behavior in ballot measure elec-
tions produces conflicting results concerning voters’ propensity to use endorse-
ments. Furthermore, the ability of governors to provide a persuasive endorsement 
for voters in direct democracy elections remains an under-examined empirical 
question. Below, we begin to remedy this oversight while adding to the literature 
that assesses whether and how often voters use elite endorsements to arrive at a 
decision.
3  Hypothesis and Data
We base our research on work of Lupia (1994) and Lupia and McCubbins (1998) who 
argue that voters can learn from cue-givers when the voters perceive the cue-giver 
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to be trustworthy and knowledgeable. Specifically, we look to see if voting on ballot 
measures is related to awareness of an elite endorsement conditional on approval 
of the endorser (which we use as a proxy for his perceived trustworthiness). 
We assume that all voters considered the endorser – Governor Schwarzenegger 
– to be knowledgeable. We use data from an election survey we conducted during 
the California presidential primary on February 5, 2008. During this election, we 
had student volunteers ask San Diego voters exiting their polling places to answer 
questions about the election. We surveyed eight polling locations (which covered 
10 precincts) across the city.1 Our volunteers gathered 615 interviews and received 
467 refusals for a cooperation rate of 56.8%. While estimating of the relationship 
between voting and the governor’s endorsement does not require random sam-
pling so long as we have random assignment2 across the two conditions (whether 
the voter recalled that Schwarzenegger supported the measures), to enhance our 
external validity, we decided to randomize our sample, instructing our volunteers 
to ask every other exiting voter for an interview. Our survey focused on, among 
1 To ensure we drew a reasonable sample with our election survey, we compare the demograph-
ics for our sample to the 2005–2009 American Community Survey (ACS) demographics. In our 
sample, respondents are more educated and disproportionately Caucasian. The remaining de-
mographics are similar to the 2005–2009 ACS demographics.
Survey 2005–2009 ACS Data for San 
Diego
Age Median between 36–45; 
11.6% > 65 years
Median age 33.6;  
10.7% > 65 years
Household income Median between $50–100,000 $61,962
HS diploma (age > 25) 99% 86.3%
College degree (age > 25) 73.5% 40.6%
Female 50.2% 49.7%
Asian or Pacific Islander 5% 15.3%
Black 1.8% 6.8%
Latino 7% 27.3%
Caucasian 76.8% 66.7%
2 Unlike our previous research (Burnett and McCubbins 2012, 2013) we cannot match respondents 
across our treatment conditions because matching makes little sense when, as we note below, 
almost 90% of our sample received the treatment. Furthermore, we cannot construct in this in-
stance a true test of Lupia and McCubbins’ theory because the limited number of questions we 
could ask and the votes on slot machines is non-ideological, the general information provided by 
the survey does not allow us to create a good estimate of assignment to the treatment or control 
group. These two confounds significantly limit the econometric tools we can use to analyze our 
data.
Gaming Direct Democracy      631
other things, Propositions 94, 95, 96, and 97. All four measures authorized certain 
Native American gaming outfits to expand their operations. We provide the offi-
cial voter guide’s description of each measure in Appendix A.
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger endorsed all four propositions. Indeed, as 
governor, his stance in favor provided voters with a visible and valuable infor-
mation shortcut for the propositions. On television advertisements, Governor 
Schwarzenegger hailed the legislation as a “historic bipartisan agreement” and 
urged voters to “vote yes for billions of dollars for California families.”3 Governor 
Schwarzenegger provided an information shortcut that satisfied both of Lupia 
and McCubbins’ (1998) conditions for persuasion (the endorser must be perceived 
to be knowledgeable and trustworthy). That is, many California voters shared a 
common interest with Governor Schwarzenegger (he had just won reelection by 
a margin of about 17 percentage points), and he was presumably knowledgeable 
about the state’s budget.
We asked respondents three questions about the referendums and Governor 
Schwarzenegger. We asked these questions only once in our survey because the 
answers are the same for each measure. We asked the following questions (in 
order):
1. True or False: Propositions 94, 95, 96, and 97 do not require complete adher-
ence to the California Environmental Quality Act. (The correct answer is 
“true,” coded as “1” for correct and “0” for incorrect and “do not know” 
responses.)
2. How many more slot machines would Propositions 94, 95, 96, and 97 allow 
if they all succeed? 25,000; 17,000; 11,000; or 4000. (The correct answer is 
“17,000,” coded as “1” for correct and “0” for incorrect and “do not know” 
responses.)
3. Do you know if Arnold Schwarzenegger supported, opposed or took no posi-
tion on the Indian Gaming referendums (Propositions 94, 95, 96, and 97)? 
(The correct answer is “supported,” coded as “1” for correct, and “0” for 
incorrect and “do not know” responses.)
In addition to the three questions above, we asked respondents to report their 
assessment of how Arnold Schwarzenegger was handling his job as governor by 
indicating whether they approved (coded as “1”) or disapproved (coded as “0”) of 
his job performance. Similar to Karp (1998; see also Rabinowitz and MacDonald 
1989; Mondak 1993), we asked voters to evaluate Governor Schwarzenegger to 
add a “direction” to his endorsement. We expect that voters who approve of how 
3 An archive of the video is available: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ueUMHseWauM.
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the governor was handling his job will view his endorsement positively, thereby 
encouraging those voters to support the measures. By contrast, voters who dis-
approved of how the governor was handling his job would be expected to view 
his endorsement negatively, leading them to vote against the measures. Finally, 
we also asked respondents to indicate how they voted on the four propositions 
in question, which serve as our dependent variables. We list all of the questions 
used in our regression in Appendix B.
We use logistic regression to estimate whether voters who both approved of 
Governor Schwarzenegger and knew of his endorsement were persuaded to vote 
for Propositions 94, 95, 96, and 97. The treatment we are interested in is the inter-
action between approval for Schwarzenegger and awareness of Schwarzenegger’s 
endorsement. Lupia and McCubbins’ theory of persuasion and choice tells us that 
voters can only be persuaded by sources they perceive as informed and trustwor-
thy. We assume that all voters consider the governor to be informed on the subject 
of statewide policy, and we assume that voters who approve of the governor’s job 
performance would believe that they share a common interest with the governor, 
and thus would consider him a trustworthy informant. We exclude respondents 
who said they “did not know” whether they approved of the governor’s perfor-
mance from the analysis since we consider positive or negative approval of the 
governor’s performance necessary for trust in his endorsement; that is, these 
individuals do not share a common interest with the governor. It is possible that 
respondents who disapproved of the governor’s performance and were aware of 
the governor’s endorsement were nonetheless persuaded by the endorsement, 
which in this case would lead them to be less likely to support the referendums he 
endorsed. Thus, we have one treatment variable, which is an interaction between 
a dichotomous variable that takes a value of one when voters approve of the 
governor and another dichotomous variable that takes a value of one when voters 
are aware of his endorsement.
The two dichotomous variables that jointly define the treatment just described, 
awareness of the endorsement and approval of Governor Schwarzenegger, we will 
refer to as awareness and approval. These two dichotomous variables enter into 
our estimation. In Lupia and McCubbins’ theory, awareness of the endorsement is 
a necessary condition for persuasion. In other words, individuals must be aware 
of Governor Schwarzenegger’s position in order to make use of his endorsement. 
The following two paragraphs describe our expectations for these variables in our 
model, given that the model also includes the interaction of the two.
The coefficient for the awareness variable, all else constant, can be inter-
preted as the interaction between awareness of the endorsement and disap-
proval for Schwarzenegger. Lupia and McCubbins (1994) show that individuals 
are sometimes persuaded against an action when they observe a positive signal 
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from a source they perceive to be opposed to their interests. We expect that 
some of those who did not express approval of Schwarzenegger’s performance 
consider him to be opposed to their interests, and were thus persuaded by his 
endorsement, leading them to vote against the propositions; this occurs only to 
the extent that disapproval indicates a belief that their interests are not aligned 
with Schwarzenegger. For this reason, we expect a significant negative correla-
tion between awareness of the endorsement and support for the propositions.
The approval variable, all else equal, represents the relationship between 
approval for Schwarzenegger and support for the propositions among those 
respondents who were not aware of the governor’s endorsement, and therefore were 
untreated. We have no theory about likely support for the propositions among 
this group of respondents: on the one hand, perhaps voters who support the gov-
ernor favor the same policies that he favors, even when they are unaware of his 
endorsement; on the other hand, perhaps conservative voters are both more likely 
to support the governor and more likely to oppose ballot measures. Although we 
do not have specific expectations for the coefficient on the approval variable, we 
consider it a likely confound that should be controlled for in the model.
In addition to the awareness and approval variables and their interaction 
(the latter representing our treatment of interest), we have a few additional 
control variables: two dichotomous measures of party identification (Democrat 
and Republican, with Independents as the excluded group), and two dichoto-
mous indicators of knowledge about the propositions.
4  Results
We present the descriptive statistics regarding voter knowledge for Propositions 
94, 95, 96, and 97 in Table 1.4 We can draw two conclusions from Table 1. First, 
not surprisingly, our sample did not appear to know much about the specifics 
of these four referendums, as only 17.1% of the respondents knew that these ref-
erendums would allow for an additional 17,000 new slot machines. Moreover, 
only 30.6% knew that these referendums did not require full compliance with the 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Second, our sample appeared to 
know, quite overwhelmingly, that Governor Schwarzenegger (the main cue-giver 
that took a position on these propositions) supported these referendums (with 
87.6% answering our question correctly).
4 There is no variation across the four referendums for these questions because we only asked 
these questions once and the answer was the same for each measure.
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While voters could identify Governor Schwarzenegger’s position, does the 
relationship between their knowledge of the endorsement and how they feel 
about the endorser seem related to how they voted? Table 2 presents the regres-
sion results for all four referendums. Three interesting findings emerge from the 
regression analysis. First, each regression indicates that voters who both knew 
that Governor Schwarzenegger supported the measures and gave Governor 
Schwarzenegger a positive job approval were significantly more likely to vote for 
the measures. This represents resounding support for our primary hypothesis. 
Second, voters who knew the governor’s position and disapproved of his job 
Table 1: Knowledge About Propositions 94, 95, 96, and 97.
Correct Incorrect Do Not Know
Proposition 94–97 would approve 17,000 additional slot 
machines
17.1% 27.2% 55.6%
Proposition 94–97 included exemptions from CEQA 30.6% 19.4% 50.0%
Governor Schwarzenegger supported Propositions 94–97 87.6% 4.2% 8.2%
Table 2: Logit Results for Referendums to Authorize Additional Slot Machines.
Prop. 94 Prop. 95 Prop. 96 Prop. 97
Approved of Governor’s performance –0.57 –0.57 –0.68 –0.58
(0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61)
Knew endorsement –1.20* –1.19* –1.15* –1.20*
(0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.52)
Approved of Gov. * Knew endorsement 1.85** 1.87** 1.83** 1.95**
(0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66)
R knows exceptions to CEQA –0.54* –0.56* –0.64** –0.56*
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
R knows number of increased slots 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.18
(0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29)
Democrat –0.15 –0.14 –0.08 –0.11
(0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37)
Republican –0.11 –0.08 –0.13 0.01
(0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.39)
Constant 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.88
(0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59)
Pseudo-R2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
N 408 407 407 405
Logit regression of vote choice (0 = vote against Proposition, 1 = vote for Proposition).
Standard errors are in parentheses. Excluded category: voters who disapproved of the  
governor’s job performance. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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performance were significantly less likely to support the measures. This, too, sug-
gests that endorsements are persuasive (in this case, convincing voters to oppose 
a policy endorsed by a source perceived as opposed to their interests). Third, 
respondents who were aware that the referendums provided exceptions from 
CEQA were significantly less likely to report that they voted for the measures. 
These voters may have learned about the CEQA exemptions by being informed 
individuals (e.g., they read the voter information guide carefully) or they could 
have learned this fact from a third-party (e.g., The Sierra Club).
Overall, Table 2 shows that voters’ use of Governor Schwarzenegger’s 
 endorsement was conditional on their evaluation of his job performance in 
 precisely the way that Lupia and McCubbins (1994, 1998) predict. The table also 
demonstrates that the value of his endorsement was independent of voters’ 
 perceptions of his job performance as job performance alone is not a significant 
predictor of vote choice.
The next step in our analysis is to compute the possible marginal relationship 
of knowing the governor’s endorsement on vote choice. To help interpret the logit 
coefficients presented in the previous table, we calculated voting probabilities for 
Propositions 94–97 using Tomz et al.’s (2001) CLARIFY program for Stata (see also 
King et al. 2000). We generated these probabilities by changing the respondent’s 
knowledge of Governor Schwarzenegger’s endorsement holding all of the 
 covariates at their median value. Figure 1 presents these calculations with 95% 
confidence intervals.
Figure 1 shows that voters’ knowledge of a cue interacted with their assess-
ment of Governor Schwarzenegger has a strong relationship to their probability of 
supporting the four referendums. In fact, there is about a 30 percentage point dis-
crepancy in support for the measures when we vary a voter’s assessment of Gov-
ernor Schwarzenegger while holding constant knowledge of his endorsement. 
Additionally, Figure 1 shows that this relationship holds for all four measures. 
Indeed, the point estimates and error bars are remarkably similar.
5  Conclusion
Our results show that voters use elite endorsements to make decisions in direct 
democracy. We also find, however, that usage of these endorsements is condi-
tional on the assessment of the cue-giver. In our survey, voters used their evalu-
ation of Governor Schwarzenegger’s job performance to inform them about how 
to use his endorsement. That is, voters who gave the governor a positive job 
approval rating were likely to view his endorsement favorably, thus leading to 
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greater support for the measures. By contrast, voters who both affixed a negative 
rating to the governor’s job performance and were aware of his endorsement were 
significantly less likely to support the measures.
Similar to other focused election surveys (e.g., Lupia 1994), our data are not 
externally valid beyond our sample. It is possible that San Diego voters – who 
may have some experience with the Indian gaming establishments located in the 
county – were more knowledgeable about these referendums when compared 
with residents of other counties. We consider this possibility remote since most 
individuals do not pay close attention to policymaking at any level of govern-
ment. While we would have preferred a statewide representative sample, such 
a study requires a prohibitive amount of resources for an exit survey. While our 
sample is imperfect, we expect that we would have seen similar results if we had 
polled voters in other California cities.
Despite our inability to claim strong external validity, we argue that our 
study’s internal validity allows us to examine voting behavior on ballot measures 
where there is not much data available. In particular, our results help to bridge 
a gap in the literature: We found that governors can be persuasive cue-givers 
in a direct democracy election that dealt with complicated budgetary matters. 
We also add to the literature on endorsements, and, more specifically, to the 
limited literature that analyzes behavior outside of the laboratory. While our 
results are encouraging, unlike much of the voting behavior literature, we are 
cautious to claim that endorsements are a panacea for voters’ information defi-
ciencies. Given the recent empirical research that questions the effectiveness of 
endorsements in direct democracy elections (Burnett et  al. 2010; Burnett and 
Parry 2012), we argue that additional research with varying electoral conditions 
is necessary to help scholars understand how often and when voters use elite 
endorsements.
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Appendix
Appendix A
Proposition 94
Summary:
“Yes” Vote approves, and “No” Vote rejects, a law that ratifies an amendment 
to existing gaming compact between the state and Pechanga Band of Luiseño 
Mission Indians. Fiscal Impact: Net increase in annual state revenues probably in 
the tens of millions of dollars, growing over time through 2030.
What Your Vote Means:
A YES vote on this measure means: The Pechanga Band of Luiseño Indians – a 
tribe that owns a casino in Riverside County with about 2000 slot machines –  
could operate up to 7500 slot machines. The tribe would make increased pay-
ments to the state annually through 2030.
A NO vote on this measure means: The Pechanga tribe would be able to continue 
operating its existing casino, but would not be able to significantly expand its 
casino operations. The tribe’s current payments to the state would not be affected.
Proposition 95
Summary:
“Yes” Vote approves, and “No” Vote rejects, a law that ratifies an amendment 
to existing gaming compact between the state and Morongo Band of Mission 
Indians. Fiscal Impact: Net increase in annual state revenues probably in the tens 
of millions of dollars, growing over time through 2030.
What Your Vote Means:
A YES vote on this measure means: The Morongo Band of Mission Indians – a 
tribe that owns a casino in Riverside County with about 2000 slot machines – 
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could operate up to 7500 slot machines. The tribe would make increased pay-
ments to the state annually through 2030.
A NO vote on this measure means: The Morongo tribe would be able to continue 
operating its existing casino, but would not be able to significantly expand its 
casino operations. The tribe’s current payments to the state would not be affected.
Proposition 96
Summary:
“Yes” Vote approves, and “No” Vote rejects, a law that ratifies an amendment to 
existing gaming compact between the state and Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay 
Nation. Fiscal Impact: Net increase in annual state revenues probably in the tens 
of millions of dollars, growing over time through 2030.
What Your Vote Means:
A YES vote on this measure means: The Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation –  
a tribe that owns a casino in San Diego County with about 2000 slot machines –  
could operate up to 5000 slot machines. The tribe would make increased pay-
ments to the state annually through 2030.
A NO vote on this measure means: The Sycuan tribe would be able to continue 
operating its existing casino, but would not be able to significantly expand its 
casino operations. The tribe’s current payments to the state would not be affected.
Proposition 97
Summary:
“Yes” Vote approves, and “No” Vote rejects, a law that ratifies an amendment to 
existing gaming compact between the state and Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla 
Indians. Fiscal Impact: Net increase in annual state revenues probably in the tens 
of millions of dollars, growing over time through 2030.
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What Your Vote Means:
A YES vote on this measure means: The Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians – 
a tribe that owns two casinos in Riverside County with about 2000 slot machines – 
could operate up to 5000 slot machines. The tribe would make increased pay-
ments to the state annually through 2030.
A NO vote on this measure means: The Agua Caliente tribe would be able to con-
tinue operating its existing casinos, but would not be able to significantly expand 
its casino operations. The tribe’s current payments to the state would not be 
affected.
Appendix B
Gubernatorial Approval
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Arnold Schwarzenegger is handling his 
job as governor?
1. Approve
2. Disapprove
3. Do not Know
Votes on Gaming Referendums
How did you vote on Proposition 94?
How did you vote on Proposition 95?
How did you vote on Proposition 96?
How did you vote on Proposition 97?
For each question, respondents could indicate “Yes,” “No,” “Do not Know,” or 
“Did not Vote.”
Factual Knowledge Questions
Propositions 94, 95, 96, and 97 do not require complete adherence to the Califor-
nia Environmental Quality Act.
1. True
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2. False
3. Unsure/Do not Know
How many more slot machines would Propositions 94, 95, 96, and 97 allow if they 
all succeed?
1. 25,000
2. 17,000
3. 11,000
4. 4000
5. Unsure/Do not Know
Governor Schwarzenegger’s Endorsement
Do you know if Arnold Schwarzenegger supported, opposed or took no position 
on the Indian Gaming referendums (Propositions 94, 95, 96, and 97)?
1. Supported
2. No position
3. Opposed
4. Unsure/Do not Know
Party Identification
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat 
an Independent or what?
(If Republican or Democrat) Would you call yourself a strong (Republican/
Democrat) or a not very strong (Republican/Democrat)?
(If Independent) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Demo-
cratic Party?
1. Strong Democrat
2. Weak Democrat
3. Independent-Democrat
4. Independent
5. Independent-Republican
6. Weak Republican
7. Strong Republican
8. Other ________
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